Denver Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 17

January 1991

Civil Rights
Denver University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Denver University Law Review, Civil Rights, 68 Denv. U. L. Rev. 555 (1991).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

CIVIL RIGHTS
Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Abercrombie, brought suit against defendants, City of
Catoosa, Mayor Conley and Police Chief Dirck. Abercrombie argued
that: (1) the mayor and police chief conspired, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1985(2) and 1986, to retaliate against him because of his testimony in
an unrelated case; (2) he was deprived of a property interest without
due process of law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) his first
amendment rights were violated when he was removed from the wrecker
rotation logs used to make referrals. The district court granted summary judgment for the mayor and police chief, and Abercrombie
appealed.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that there was no conspiracy. The
court explained that Abercrombie failed to prove that the two isolated
statements of the mayor and police chief satisfied the "meeting of the
minds" requirement needed to prove a conspiracy. Accordingly, the
district court properly dismissed Abercrombie's conspiracy complaint.
Second, the court ruled that Abercrombie was deprived of a property
interest without due process of law when he was removed from the
wrecker referral list. The court explained that an Oklahoma statute required the City of Catoosa to make wrecker referrals on an equal basis.
Thus, a property interest was created in wrecker referrals. The court
also reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") on
Abercrombie's first amendment claim. The court reasoned that the
JNOV was based on the district court's incorrect conclusion that Abercrombie had no property interest in wreck referrals. Moreover, the
court noted that a benefit cannot be denied to a person on a basis that
infringes a constitutionally protected interest. Thus, the court remanded for reinstatement of the jury award.
DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Bevers, appealed a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff, DeLoach. After murder charges against DeLoach were withdrawn,
DeLoach filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that
Bevers, the detective assigned to investigate the murder, violated her
constitutional rights. The district court found that Bevers unconstitutionally retaliated against DeLoach for exercising her right to retain
counsel and caused her to be arrested pursuant to an intentionally false
and misleading affidavit. Bevers argued on appeal that: (1) she could
not be held responsible for DeLoach's arrest because there were many
intervening actors making independent determinations; (2) she was en-
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titled to qualified immunity; (3) several jury instructions were prejudicial; and (4) the court should grant a remittitur.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that the alleged misstatements and omissions were material
enough that the district court was justified in submitting the question of
probable cause to the jury. Second, the court explained that since the
arrest violated the fourteenth amendment and Bevers displayed a reckless disregard for the truth, she was not entitled to good faith immunity.
Third, the court held that Bevers did not object to most of the jury instructions at trial, and there was no plain error as to those instructions.
Finally, the court did not consider the remittitur claim since Bevers
failed to make the appropriate argument.
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386
Author: Judge Christensen, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Bryson, individually and as administratrix of the estate of
Husband, appealed the district court's dismissal of both her 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim against the City of Edmond, its police chief, and members
of the Oklahoma Air National Guard, and a Bivens action against the
postmaster. Husband and others were killed or injured when they were
shot by Sherrill, a fellow post office employee. The Edmond City police
arrived at the scene within minutes of the outset of the shooting but
classified the massacre as a hostage situation and did not attempt to
enter the building for more than an hour and a half. Bryson alleged that
in making this decision, the police deprived her husband of substantive
due process and associational rights in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that negligent conduct does not implicate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to afford § 1983
relief. In the case at hand, Bryson pleaded intentional, willful, and wanton disregard for Husband's rights or in the alternative, gross negligence. The court concluded that notwithstanding the pleading, there
was no indication of culpability other than ordinary negligence. Furthermore, the court held that the city had no affirmative duty under the
fourteenth amendment to protect Husband from another individual. Finally, the court stated that pursuant to § 1983, a claim for the deprivation of a right to familial association is shown when there is intent to
interfere with a particular relationship. The court found that the postmaster's and Air National Guard's failure to train, supervise, examine or
afford medical care to Sherrill did not show a specific intent to interfere
with the specific relationship in question.
Barnardv. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Barnard, contended that his civil rights were violated when
the Utah State Bar refused to publish a letter he wrote. Specifically, Barnard claimed that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his constitutional right to
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free speech and his right to due process of law were violated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, Chamberlain, commissioner of the Utah State Bar. Barnard subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first considered Barnard's § 1983 claim. The
court stated that for a successful claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that a person acting under state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution. The court found sufficient facts supporting
Barnard's conclusion that the refusal to publish his article was taken
under color of state law. The court next considered whether Barnard
was deprived of his first amendment rights; this depends on the nature
of the forum to which he seeks access. The court ruled that the fact the
government sponsors a medium of communication does not automatically render that means of communication a public forum. Moreover,
the Utah Bar Association was unequivocal in its intent to close the Bar
Letter to the public. Furthermore, the court rejected Barnard's argument
that because the Utah Bar Association published three other articles,
there was intent to create a public forum. The court explained that the
articles were not randomly submitted, but were instead written at the
request of the Utah Bar Association. Finally, there was no viewpoint
discrimination when the Utah Bar refused to publish Barnard's article.
The record clearly indicated that the Bar Letter refused to publish any
randomly submitted opinion.
Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Clark, brought suit against defendant, Poulton, a parole
officer for the Utah State Correction Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Clark alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by two
incidents of excessive force: by the denial of medical treatment, and by
the denial of reasonable access to the mails. A magistrate recommended
that Clark's claims be dismissed, and the district court entered judgment
accordingly. On appeal, Clark asserted that the magistrate had no jurisdiction because the referral was not authorized by statute.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the magistrate was without jurisdiction
and consequently reversed the district court's decision. The court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) allows ajudge to appoint a magistrate
to serve as a special master over dispositive motions, applications for
post-conviction relief, and prisoner petitions challenging conditions of
confinement. Since no dispositive motion was filed, and since Clark was
not seeking post-conviction relief, the only applicable provision was the
one challenging "conditions of confinement." The court ruled, however, that "conditions of confinement" do not encompass the use of excessive force alleged by Clark. This is because Clark's claims involved
isolated events, and "conditions of confinement" include ongoing
prison practices and regulations. Moreover, the court added that one of
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the excessive force claims arose from an incident occurring before Clark
was jailed. In addition, pursuant to § 636(c), the district court must
make a special designation, and the consent of the parties must be communicated to the clerk of the court. Neither of these factors were satisfied. Second, Clark's failure to object to proceedings before the
magistrate did not amount to a consent of jurisdiction. The court explained that parties, by their conduct, cannot extend the magistrate's
jurisdiction.
Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Crabtree, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, alleging a conspiracy between opposing attorneys and Oklahoma State District Judge
Cook. The district court dismissed the conspiracy claims against the attorneys. Moreover, it granted the judge's motion to dismiss as a motion
for summary judgment, based on absolute judicial immunity. Last, the
district court awarded attorney's fees to the judge.
The Tenth Circuit, considering three companion appeals, upheld
the dismissal of the conspiracy claims as to both the judge and the attorneys. The district court correctly construed the complaint as stating insufficient facts to show any evidence of a conspiracy between the judge
and the attorneys. Also, the court ruled that absolute judicial immunity
properly barred the action against the judge since he acted solely in his
judicial capacity. The court further affirmed the award of attorneys' fees
to the judge because no reasonable attorney could believe that absolute
judicial immunity would not bar the action. Finally, the court reversed
the denial of attorneys' fees to the attorneys. The court held that since
Oklahoma state courts previously denied Crabtree's claims to the disputed property, no reasonable attorney would institute a conspiracy action under § 1983 to assert title claims.
Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Dixon, brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985(3) against the City of Lawton and several police officers regarding the shooting death of her son. The district court held in
favor of the police officers and the City on the § 1983 claim, and in favor
of the police officers on the § 1985(3) claim. Dixon subsequently appealed. On appeal, Dixon argued that: (1) the district court erred in
instructing the jury that § 1983 liability was a condition precedent to
§ 1985(3) liability; and (2) the district court's admission of certain information contained in Dixon's medical records was erroneous because of
evolving federal common law privilege.
The Tenth Circuit first held that § 1983 liability is not a condition
precedent to liability under § 1985(3). The court reasoned that there
are several important differences between the sections. In addition, in
order to recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, Dixon must prove
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not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights. Last,
communications between psychotherapists and the son were admissable.
The court explained that after the son's death, the privilege did not apply in the proceeding because Dixon relied upon the son's previous
emotional condition as an element of her defense.
Gulley v. Orr, 905 F.2d 1383
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Gulley, appealed the district court's verdict in favor of defendant, Orr, Secretary of the Air Force. Gulley brought suit against
Orr under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act claiming that he was subjected to severe discipline and was not promoted because he was black
and because he had complained of discrimination. On appeal, Gulley
argued that: (1) the exhaustion of his individual administrative remedies
was sufficient to enable him to assert class claims in federal court;
(2) the district court erred in finding that the disciplinary actions instituted against him were not discriminatory; and (3) the district court
erred in denying his motion for defaultjudgment and in quashing two of
his subpoenas.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
ruled that one of Gulley's class actions was barred from federal court
because his class administrative remedies had not been exhausted.
Moreover, the exhaustion of individual administrative remedies was insufficient. The court further found that Orr rebutted the unlawful discrimination charges by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Gulley's motion for a default judgment or in quashing two of his subpoenas.
Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Hannula, sought damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries allegedly sustained during an
arrest by a police officer from the City of Lakewood. Defendant, Lively,
moved for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense.
The district court denied the motion, and Lively appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted summary
judgment. The court reasoned that Hannula must prove that Lively's
actions constituted an excessive use of force under a substantive due
process standard. The court required Hannula to prove that: (1) the
force used was excessive to the need presented; (2) the injury was excessive; and (3) Lively's motive was improper. After assessing the facts,
the court found the evidence insufficient to clearly constitute a constitutional violation and, therefore, granted summary judgment.
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Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Maple and Reed, were attacked while in prison. Reed suffered serious knife wounds. Both Maple and Reed filed a pro se civil
rights action, which was later dismissed by the district court. The district court reasoned that the complaint was legally frivolous pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Maple and Reed appealed, arguing: (1) cruel and
unusual punishment and denial of equal protection because a corrections officer displayed gross disregard in failing to promptly come to
Reed's aid; (2) conspiracy to neglect and discriminate against Reed in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments; and (3) denial of
proper and speedy medical assistance after the injury.
The Tenth Circuit first held that the district court was correct in
dismissing the cruel and unusual punishment and equal protection
claims. The court reasoned that there was no arguable basis for a constitutional claim based on a correctional officer's failure to prevent injury to a prisoner. Also, Reed failed to provide any evidence supporting
denial of equal protection rights or due process rights. Moreover, the
district court properly dismissed the conspiracy claim. The court held
that Reed and Maple's claim alleging a general discriminatory conspiracy was unfocused, conclusory and deficient in showing elements of
agreement and concerted action. Finally, Reed's deliberate indifference
claim was incorrectly dismissed and was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court stated that the district court misread
Reed's deliberate indifference claim as involving a mere difference of
opinion with prison medical staff. The actual focus of the claim was not
the character of the care provided, but the delay in furnishing it. There
was nothing in the record to indicate Reed's two hour delay in receiving
medical attention was based on any competent medical opinion. In light
of the liberal substantive standard used for § 1915(d) allegations, the
dismissal of the second cause of action was improper.
Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiffs, Riggs and others, filed a civil rights class action suit
against defendant, City of Albuquerque ("Albuquerque"), seeking, inter
alia, to prevent the destruction of certain intelligence documents. The
documents were investigative files kept by the Intelligence Unit of the
Albuquerque Police Department. The class alleged that the documents
were retained without a proper police purpose. The class argued that
this surveillance had a chilling effect on their first amendment rights,
causing injury to their personal, political, and professional reputations.
The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The class
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case
for lack of standing. The court ruled that the district court erroneously
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construed the class' complaint as alleging only a general chilling of their
rights because of a suspicion that police investigations were carried out
improperly. The court found that the complaint did allege harm to personal, political, and professional reputations in the community. It also
alleged that they were the actual targets of illegal investigations. Accordingly, the court reasoned that the class brought forth a cognizable,
continuing injury which presented a case or controversy for the court to
consider.
Ware v. Unified School Dist., 902 F.2d 815
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Ware, brought suit against defendant, Unified School District No. 492 ("school board"), alleging that her first amendment rights
were violated when the superintendent of schools fired her allegedly because she opposed a bond issue. The district court directed a verdict for
the school board, and Ware subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that a local governmental entity, such as a
school board, may only be held liable for decisions made by final policymakers. Under Kansas law, the school board, not the superintendent,
has final decisionmaking authority. Accordingly, the school board cannot be liable for the superintendent's actions. The court, nonetheless,
noted that there are circumstances in which a governmental entity will
be liable for a subordinate's decisions due to a delegation of final decisionmaking power. This occurs, for example, when a subordinate's decision is couched as a policy statement, or when the decision manifests a
custom or usage. In the case at hand, the court ruled that the
subordinate's decision to terminate Ware's employment was not cast in
terms of a policy statement, nor was there proof that the decision represented a custom or usage. Second, the court determined whether the
school board could be held liable for constitutional deprivation arising
from its own decision to fire Ware. The court stated that to find liability,
a direct causal link must exist between the acts of the governing body
sought to be held liable and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Such
a link may be established when the governing body has exercised its
decisionmaking authority with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected by its decisions. In this case, the record
contained sufficient evidence to create a jury question on whether the
school board acted with deliberate indifference in approving Ware's dismissal. The court reversed and remanded to the district court.

